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Abstract. Import-dependent arid Arab micro states such as those in the Persian Gulf are 
particularly vulnerable to food-security risk. Among the many remedial policy suggestions is 
some initiation or increase in domestic production to insulate these countries from supply 
disruption, import price volatility and high import prices. This paper does not address the 
efficacy of domestic production but notes that such production will require government 
intervention in the form of production subsidies to mitigate market risk. The narrow focus of 
this paper is to provide a conceptual model of subsidies that avoids many previous problems in 
established subsidy systems. The paper describes a subsidy model that makes the most use of 
market signals, avoids perverse incentives, and provides a structure to encourage efficiency, 
quality enhancement and product differentiation in agricultural products. The system is designed 
to be WTO compliant. The model has two components: a calculation of the true economic cost 
of a unit of an agricultural product and a deficit payment that is calculated to bridge the gap 
between true economic cost and market remuneration. The structure of the deficit payment is 
crucial to the establishment of a beneficial incentive system. The paper provides a mathematical 
rendering of the model, analysis of the associated incentive structure and a numerical example 
for a hypothetical Arab micro state. 
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1. BACKGROUND 
During the food crisis of 2007/2008 some observers opined that the import-dependent Arab 
world was particularly hard hit by food disruptions, high prices and price volatility.  (World Bank 
2009)  Many food-security proposals emerged, including increased strategic storage, forward 
contracting, enhanced import diversification, improved logistics and other measures.  Some 
policy makers suggested at least a non-trivial level of domestic production to assist in insulating 
Arab countries from the effects of external price volatility and export prohibitions that resulted 
from total or near total import dependence.  (World Bank 2009)  The problems that must be 
overcome to enhance domestic production in Arab countries, however, are daunting—water 
scarcity, arable land constraints, lack of efficient distribution systems, trade barriers, access to 
capital, market risk, etc.  These problems are exacerbated by scale issues that confront Arab 
micro states such as the majority of those in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).5,6 
 
Embryonic agricultural development, especially in micro states, will almost certainly require some 
level of government intervention, in particular production subsidies.  This paper does not opine 
on or analyze the efficacy, or desirability, of domestic production in Arab micro states, but rather 
considers situations where decisions have been made to develop at least some domestic 
production, or states where such production already exists but existing subsidies may be highly 
inefficient.7  
 
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) already has a fairly substantial agricultural sector.  Some 
70,000 hectares are under cultivation (latest figures—2009) producing about 2 million tonnes of 
agricultural products, including 1.6 million tonnes of field crops, over 170,000 tonnes of 
vegetables and almost 280,000 tonnes of fruit.  In addition, the UAE has developed livestock 
with over 4 million head of sheep, goats, and cattle. (UAE 2012) 
                                                 
5 Some have proposed greater cooperation in purchasing among GCC states to achieve the economies of purchasing 
power scale necessary to mitigate import price volatility and other food security dilemmas that result from lack of 
scale.  It is beyond the purview of this paper to analyze this possibility, and heretofore cooperation has proved 
illusive, but it is surely a desirable topic for further research. 
 
6 These include countries such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), all having 
miniscule populations. According to Streeten (1993), a country is considered to be “small” if its population were less 
than 10 million people. Save for the UAE, the Arab micro states we consider have populations much smaller, in the 
2 to 3 million range and therefore we refer to them as micro states. 
 
7 It is also beyond the purview of this paper to opine on the geopolitical implications of food insecurity in micro 
GCC countries, some of whom are quite wealthy.  Suffice it to say that these countries are major energy suppliers, 
that their energy sectors are highly dependent on expatriate human capital, and that the foreign work force is 
affected by food-security issues.  Debating whether food-security can be ignored in wealthy GCC micro states is a 
subject for an entirely separate paper dedicated to that subject. 
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The State of Qatar has embarked on a national initiative to develop some level of domestic 
production for food security purposes.  The Qatar National Food Security Programme (QNFSP) 
envisions employing industrial scale solar plants to power desalination facilities dedicated to 
agricultural irrigation.  Coupled with high-tech production methods such as hydroponics, 
QNFSP proposes to start what would effectively be a new agricultural sector to augment 
increased strategic storage and rationalization of imports.  The initiative is still in the concept 
phase and no production has yet occurred, although Qatar does currently produce some fruits 
and vegetables. (QNFSP 2012) 
 
Kuwait has developed agriculture in certain sectors.  The latest data (2006/2007) show 684,000 
tonnes of production of vegetables and field crops, 37,000 tonnes of meat and over 200,000 
tonnes of eggs and dairy items. (IMF 2011)  Much of the meat production is in poultry. 
 As stated, it is well beyond the scope of this paper to assess the desirability of domestic 
agricultural production in Arab micro states, which would require a social cost-benefit analysis.  
Whether ill advised or not, if such production is to occur production subsidies will be necessary, 
and it is in the interests of these micro states to design them properly, so as not to squander 
scarce resources.  Therefore the limited goal of this paper is to present a conceptual model of 
production subsidies that diminish inefficiency and perverse incentives, encourage quality 
enhancement, minimize budgetary expenditure, and are WTO compliant.  The paper’s focus is 
on subsidies in Arab micro states such as those in the GCC.  We refer to productions subsidies 
as contained in a Market Stabilization System (MSS). 
 
Production subsidies will be required for several reasons.  First, the resource scarcity and 
distribution problems previously mentioned are serious.  Second, scale is a complicating issue in 
micro-states.  The same small scale that makes import diversification difficult—leading to high 
and volatile import prices—results in production-efficiency issues for some products  and 
distribution-chain problems.  Third, competing imports are often subsidized.   
 
In a sense, government intervention through production subsidies is a reasonable component of 
a Public Private Partnership (PPP) system.  PPPs have addressed enhancing access to the supply 
chain for small-holder producers (Rich and Narrod 2010), and promoting food safety and quality 
control through collective action, involving government and private sector entities. (Narrod et al 
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2009)  Production subsidies are one form of mitigating market risk—a legitimate PPP function; 
akin in some respects to long-term, fixed-price contracts.8   
 
Any MSS must avoid the historically created complexities, distortions, perverse incentives and 
massive budgetary problems that have been associated with, for example, the EU’s Common 
Agricultural Policy, or the U.S. Farm Program.  It also must not rely on subsidized or free inputs 
that lead to resource inefficiency, overuse, and may result in environmental problems.  Input 
subsidies have been used in the UAE (UAE 2006) and Kuwait (USDA-FAS 2006) Micro states 
without a history of agriculture are ironically in the unique position of starting fresh when 
designing a MSS.  The MSS described in this paper will bear little relationship to traditional 
domestic support systems in developed countries with mature agricultural sectors. 
 
The goals of a MSS would be to make the greatest use of market forces, minimize perverse 
incentives that encourage inefficiency while discouraging product differentiation and quality 
enhancement, mitigate fraud possibilities, and maximize fiscal efficiency.9  This analysis will 
describe, conceptually, a model for a hypothetical Arab micro state that we will denote as 
“Watan” that attempts to fulfill the goals just stated.  Watan is a composite of GCC micro states.  
The paper will include a mathematical representation of the model, as well as provide a 
numerical example.  The numerical example is for illustrative purposes only.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 will introduce the conceptual MSS 
model.  Section 3 will present the derivation of the full economic cost of a unit of a specific 
agricultural commodity.  Section 4 will analyze the incentives associated with a few examples of 
deficit or truing-up payments—the subsidy required to fill the gap between market price and full 
economic cost.  Section 5 will provide a numerical example of the model, including two of the 
options described in Section 4.  Section 6 will offer discussion and consider future research.   
To demonstrate concepts throughout the paper, we employ corn used as poultry feed as an 
illustrative commodity.  Corn would initially appear an odd choice for an illustration of the MSS 
in arid Arab micro states, but we note that the UAE produces field crops on 28,000 hectares of 
                                                 
8 Mitigating market risk is essential to food-security-related embryonic agricultural investments in Arab micro states.  
Given the emphasis on social, as opposed to private, returns, and limited market outlets, such investments bear 
many of the characteristics of “idiosyncratic” assets (Williamson, 1975) where lock-in and contractual-opportunism 
issues reign, and mitigation of market risk is especially crucial to private-sector investment. 
  
9 The latter two topics are not within the scope of this paper and are subjects for future research. 
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land, including over 240,000 tonnes of alfalfa, sorghum and corn. (UAE 2012)  In 2005 UAE 
produced almost 19,000 tonnes of corn. (UAE 2006)  
 
It is clear that production subsidies would be required for corn poultry feed production in Arab 
micro states given the lack of comparative advantage, allowing for a plausible demonstration of 
the model. In light of scale issues import diversification is very difficult for grains.  For example 
Qatar imports about 90% of its corn from one country—Argentina.10  This is further incentive 
for some domestic production. 
 
Finally Gulf countries have shown an interest in expanding poultry production in part due to 
halal requirements and the expense of monitoring them on imports.  Kuwait has, in recent 
periods, been 22 to 48% self-sufficient in poultry.  (FAO 2010)  Al-Nassar (2006) has stated: 
“The poultry industry in Kuwait is one of the leading food industries in the country. It consists 
of several poultry companies that vary between large, medium and small size poultry producers.” 
In 2007, Kuwait’s broiler production was on the order of 35,000 tonnes, and two companies 
were responsible for 75% of production. (USDA-FAS 2006) Currently the Kuwait poultry 
industry produces feed from corn imports subsidized by the government.   This system is very 
expensive and drives up domestic poultry costs.  (USDA-FAS 2006)11  
 
Countries with existing or embryonic poultry sectors have stressed the need for secure supply 
sources for poultry feed, including enhanced domestic production.  For these reasons corn 
poultry feed will be used in the numerical example contained in this paper but we in no way 
opine on the desirability of producing corn in the arid climates of Arab micro states; merely 
noting that it is being done and is agronomically feasible. 
 
2. Derivation of the Conceptual MSS Model 
The MSS system has two parts: 1) a “Full Cost Price” (FCP) which is defined as the true, all-
inclusive economic cost of a unit of an agricultural commodity; and 2) a “Deficit Payment” 
which is a “truing up” to ensure that the farmer receives full economic cost remuneration in 
cases where the market price is insufficient.  A crucial and differentiating aspect of the MSS 
described here is that whereas the FCP is calculated periodically, the Deficit Payment is 
                                                 
10 Authors’ calculations based on micro data provided by the Qatar Customs and Ports Authority, 2011. 
 
11 This was confirmed in an interview with Mutlaq Y. Al-Zayed, Deputy Managing Director, Kuwait Flour Mills & 
Bakeries in Kuwait City in April 2012.  Kuwait Flour Mills operates the corn distribution program. 
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determined on a transaction-by-transaction basis.  This is a key to maximization of market 
incentives, and avoids the problems associated with traditional domestic support systems where 
subsidies are set at the same level per unit for all producers, regardless of their structures, 
efficiencies, and business models.   In the case of micro states, scale becomes an advantage in 
this area.  The small market size makes transaction-by-transaction calculations feasible with even 
minimal use of information technology (IT) tools. 
 
3. The FCP Model 
The starting point for each crop will be the construction of a cost model which accounts for the 
economic cost of a unit of output—all variable and allocated fixed costs plus a cost of capital 
which reflects the minimum equity rate of return necessary to induce investors to make an 
investment in a farm (the “hurdle” rate, or opportunity cost of capital) and keep capital flowing 
to the enterprise. The output of each commodity model will be a FCP which reflects the total 
economic cost of producing a unit of a given crop. 
 
The cost components that sum to the FCP can be divided into two broad categories: operating 
costs and “ownership” costs (otherwise known as the “cost of capital”).  All costs are first 
calculated on a per-hectare basis (or equivalent basis based on standard size measurement), and 
then are converted to unit costs based on an analysis of yield.  The general formula for a FCP of 
a specific commodity is: 
   
Y
HcHfv
FCP
V
mi
F
mj
C
mg
mgmjmi
m
  
  


1)( 1)( 1)(
)()()(
     (1) 
Where: 
FCPm   = FCP for a unit of commodity m; 
vi(m)         = per-hectare variable cost of input i for commodity m; 
fj(m)       = total fixed costs of fixed-cost category j for commodity m; 
H  = total hectares; and 
cg(m)        = total capital costs for capital-type g associated with commodity m.  
The methodology employed to calculate the cost of an agricultural commodity produced in 
Watan in this study was designed to be consistent with revised costing methodologies as derived 
in 2000 by a Task Force of the Agricultural & Applied Economics Association (AAEA) and 
published in a study entitled Commodity Costs and Returns Handbook. (AAEA 2000) The AAEA 
study is used by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) in the construction of all 
of its commodity-cost data bases. (USDA-ERS 2009) 
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3.1. Operating Costs 
Operating costs include variable costs such as seed, fertilizer, fuel, lubrication, electricity, water, 
maintenance, pesticides and other chemicals, labor expenses; and allocated fixed costs such as 
those associated with accounting, management functions and general farm overhead.  These 
costs can be generally derived from accounting data on a per-hectare basis.   
 
3.2. Capital Costs 
Some prior cost models of agriculture in the MENA region have assigned simple mark-ups to 
operating costs, or assumed percentage ad hoc return rates, to reflect the ownership or capital 
costs of a farm, which are then incorporated in the unit cost of a commodity. (Mazid and Aw-
Hassan 2010)  This may be appropriate in the case of small-holder agriculture, where family 
farms are passed from generation to generation (with property rights either formal or informal), 
and alternative economic opportunities for those associated with the farms are limited.  In such 
cases both physical and human capital are subject to lock-in, in which case all returns over 
operating costs are essentially residuals.  These residuals can be highly variable, and are not 
subject to modeling, as would be the case for opportunity cost.  For this type of fact pattern, 
rules-of-thumb involving ranges based on rough averages may be the best option for assigning 
ownership costs.    
 
In the case of countries like our hypothetical Watan, with embryonic agricultural sectors, 
agricultural investments are idiosyncratic, but there are many other alternative investment 
opportunities.   Therefore the cost of capital must be modeled to include the equity returns 
necessary for investors to forgo alternative investments in favor of investment in agricultural 
facilities. This is best done by incorporating finance theory, including risk analysis and portfolio 
theory. (AAEA 2000) 
 
There are many investment models that may pertain to Watan’s embryonic agricultural sector.  
These include owner/operator, owner/contractor, Watan/foreign joint ventures, Direct Foreign 
Investment and regional investors treating minority or majority agricultural investments the same 
as any investment alternatives.  To properly model the economics of farming in Watan, models 
must reflect a true economic cost of capital and in particular the opportunity-cost of investment. 
In this paper the starting point is the traditional user cost of capital approach. (Jorgenson 1963; 
Hall and Jorgenson 1967; Fullerton 1987)  Recent literature has used this concept to model 
investment behavior in the farm sector. (Lewis et al 1988; Lagerkvist 1999)  The user cost of 
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capital is also referred to as the “implicit rental rate” and allows capital costs to be allocated to 
individual unit prices of agricultural products. 
 
The concept behind the user cost of capital is the common finance one that an investor will only 
commit to an asset purchase if the associated cash-flow net-present-value (NPV) is non-negative 
when evaluated at an appropriate cost of capital.  It is highly probable, and therefore assumed, 
that new investments in agriculture based on food security in a country like Watan will not be 
subject to tax.  Therefore it is reasonable to model the user cost of capital under the assumption 
that the income flows from the resulting enterprises will not be taxed.  In the absence of taxes, 
and stated in continuous time, the traditional cash flow expression to determine equilibrium 
NPV is: 
dteeceq ttdt  



0
         (2) 
Where: 
q = original asset cost; 
c = rate of cash flow; 
d = the nominal rate at which the investor discounts cash flows; 
π = the inflation rate at which cash flows grow from the initial level; and 
δ = the economic rate of depreciation, or an asset’s loss of economic value as it ages. 
Evaluation of the integral produces the classic formula for the user cost of capital: 
)(   dqc           (3) 
d, the nominal discount rate, is the weighted-average cost of capital (WACC): 
ED iid )1(            (4) 
Where: 
iD = the nominal debt interest rate associated with the financing of the farm asset; 
iE = the required equity rate of return (opportunity cost); and 
ω = the share of debt in the total financing of the asset in question. 
 
The rate of return on equity required to induce an investor to purchase an asset and to keep 
capital flowing to the enterprise, iE, is modeled in this paper through use of the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM).  (Sharpe 1964; Lintner 1965)     
 
CAPM has seen much use lately in modeling agricultural investment.  The AAEA Handbook 
devotes a substantial amount of space to the use of CAPM in agricultural settings.  (AAEA 2000, 
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Chapter 2)  A recent USDA-funded empirical study found CAPM very useful in modeling the 
returns received by agricultural cooperatives in the U.S.  (Pederson 1998) The CAPM expression 
for an equity hurdle rate is provided in the data section. 
 
4. Deficit Payment Options and Associated Incentives 
A Deficit Payment is a mechanism by which a farmer is remunerated for any difference between 
the FCP and actual price the farmer receives in the market for a given commodity.  The structure 
of a Deficit Payment can be a very thorny exercise, because the possibilities of inadvertently 
producing perverse incentives are rampant.  In this section three, of many, options for Deficit 
Payments will be considered, and simple analytics are offered to depict the associated incentives.  
As previously stated the Deficit Payments occur on a transaction-by-transaction basis, as 
opposed to a system utilizing a flat, per-unit payment that is the same for all farmers and all 
transactions.  This distinction substantially affects the incentives of any system, and is essential to 
make the most of market forces.  Scale, as stated before, is an ally in the implementation of a 
transaction-based system. 
 
Before discussing various options, it is worth noting a hypothetical nation such as Watan’s WTO 
obligations with respect to agricultural subsidies.  There are two types of subsidies relevant to 
our WTO consideration:  “Amber-Box” subsidies tied to production levels and “Green-Box” 
subsidies that are typically lump-sum and not tied to production levels.12  Developed agricultural 
producers were required to make Amber Box, but not Green Box, reduction commitments 
during the Uruguay Round.  Arab micro states in situations similar to the hypothetical Watan, 
however, were not required to make any commitments regarding agricultural subsidies, even 
potential Amber-Box ones.  The WTO Agreement on Agriculture, nonetheless, states that 
countries that did not make reduction commitments cannot subsequently implement trade-
distorting subsidies in excess of 10% of the value of agricultural production in the relevant year. 
(WTO 1995)  Should the Doha Round of WTO negotiations be concluded, Watan’s situation 
regarding agriculture subsidies will not change, according to the latest draft of the Doha Round’s 
modalities for a new agriculture agreement.  (WTO 2008)   
 
4.1 Traditional Deficiency Payment 
A traditional deficiency payment (TDP) is an Amber-Box subsidy that simply remits to the 
farmer the monetary difference between the FCP and the actual price at which the farmer sold a 
                                                 
12 There are also “Blue Box” subsidies which are similar to Amber Box ones, but where production levels are fixed.  
These are not relevant to our analysis. 
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relevant commodity to an unrelated party (recall that the model in this paper provides for 
transaction-by-transaction remuneration).  The remittance would be issued by the Watan 
government during some “truing-up” period. 
 
TDPs would be inefficient in a small country like Watan, and would produce serious perverse 
incentives. The scale issue is important for understanding potential agricultural market structure 
in micro states.  Perverse incentives result from a TDP structure, including a lack of motivation 
to follow best practices.   
 
4.1.1. Efficiency and the TDP System 
A simple mathematical representation of the incentives the TDP illustrates the effects on 
efficiency.  Let Ĉmi represent total economic costs under best practices for commodity m at farm 
i.  For the representative best-practices farm, note that Ĉmi =FCPm.  Pmi is the price received by 
farm i in the market, which may deviate from the equilibrium market price for standard goods 
produced under best practices, Pm.  Define τmi to be a positive or negative deviation from Ĉmi for 
farm i.   qmi is defined to be a measure of additional unit innovation costs required for quality or 
product differentiation for farm i, and will be considered below. We assume the following 
function:  Pmi=F(τmi, qmi). 
 
The following relationships hold:  If Ĉmi represents normal unit costs under best practices then if 
τmi >0 (implying waste), the market will not compensate standard,  non-quality-enhancing costs 
above best practices through price premiums, as the quality of the goods will not exceed the 
norm: 
0


im
im
P

  for all τmi >0.          (5) 
But cost expenditure less than Ĉm will result in an inferior product, from economizing on quality 
control, proper handling, rigorous harvest schedules, etc.  The market will reflect a sub-standard 
product through a discounted price: 
0


im
im
P

 for all τmi <0.         (6) 
Consider the economic-rent-possibilities formula facing an agricultural firm under a TDP 
system.13  Rent is defined as:  
  mimimimimimmi qCPPFCP  

      (7) 
                                                 
13 “Economic rent” is a return to capital in excess of opportunity cost. 
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Where the term in parentheses on the right hand side is the TDP.  The farmer also receives the 
individual unit price, as set in the market.  FCPm and Ĉmi are fixed.  Note that if τmi = 0, Pmi = Pm   
and qmi = 0, FCPm = Ĉmi and rents are zero.   
 
The farm-specific price terms in (7) cancel and (7) can be written as: 
mimimimmi qCFCP  

        (8) 
This implies that with respect to normal cost deviations from best practices: 
01
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
 for all τm>0; and      (9) 
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
  for all τm<0       (10) 
Whereas there are no incentives to allow non-quality-enhancing costs to exceed the best 
practices level, as they will not be compensated for in the market and will therefore produce 
returns lower than opportunity cost, rents can be gained by economizing on costs so that they 
are less than the best practices level.  Skimping on quality control, handling, prompt delivery, etc. 
will result in profit above opportunity cost.  This is because whatever discount occurs in the 
market due to inferior goods is made up by a higher TDP. 
 
4.1.2. Quality and Product Differentiation in a TDP system. 
In addition, under a TDP system there would be a lack of incentives to enhance quality or 
produce products differentiated by superior quality characteristics.  Although still debated, many 
economists subscribe to the belief that differentiated products entail enhanced quality 
characteristics, and that competition in the quality-characteristic space benefits consumers.  
(Klein and Leffler 1981; Landes and Posner 1987)  Quite a bit of empirical research on product 
differentiation has been conducted regarding the agricultural sector, and the results imply that 
quality-related product-differentiation, with associated price premiums, exist even for basic 
commodities.  (Rosenbaum and Wilson 1991; Raboy and Simpson 1992; Wiggins and Raboy 
1996). 
 
Production of differentiated products in agriculture typically involves increased costs, but, absent 
distortions that interfere with market functioning, producers are compensated by price premiums 
in excess of these additional costs in the market (quasi-rents), which provide incentives to 
innovate.  (Raboy and Wiggins 1997)  A TDP mechanism applied on a transaction-by-transaction 
basis, however, eliminates incentives to compete in the quality-differentiation space because the 
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farmer’s TDP is limited to the difference between the FCP, a fixed amount, and the price the 
farmer receives in the market.  The perverse result is that when a farmer enjoys a price premium 
in the market, it is negated by the lower TDP he/she will receive.  
 
In normal circumstances, quality-enhancing investment costs yield price premiums: 
0


mi
mi
q
P
            (11) 
But with reference to equation (8), we see that under the TDP system: 
01


mi
mi
q
  for all qmi.       (12) 
There is no incentive to strive for enhanced quality or produce differentiated products.  Any 
premium price is negated by a lower TDP.  At a normal zero-rent position, expenditure on 
quality-related investments will only serve to lower equity returns below opportunity cost. 
 
4.2. Percentage Mark-up Deficit Payment Method 
One way to substantially avoid the perverse incentives associated with a TDP system would be 
to calculate a percentage mark-up which would define the Deficit Payment as a Mark-Up 
Payment or MUP.  The MUP would equal the product of the mark-up and the price actually 
received in the market for a given transaction.  A pure mark-up system would also be an Amber-
Box subsidy. 
 
This type of system would require some preliminary calculations, but they are transparent.  For 
ease of explanation we will consider only the initial calculation, understanding that periodic 
adjustments will be necessary.  The first step would be to calculate the FCP for each commodity.  
Each FCP would then be compared to the periodic weighted-average price of competing imports 
in order to calculate a systematic percentage difference between the FCP and the indicative 
competitive market price, as represented by the average import price.  These percentage mark-
ups would be adopted for MUP purposes and would be fixed for each commodity, over a set 
period of time.  The MUP would be calculated for each farmer on a transaction-by-transaction 
basis by multiplying the price the farmer actually received in the market by the fixed percentage 
mark-up.   
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The perverse incentives associated with the traditional deficiency payment likely do not exist 
when the Deficit Payment is defined as a percentage mark-up on received market price, or are 
certainly mitigated.   
 
4.2.1. Efficiency in a MUP System 
Consider the effects of a mark-up system on efficiency.   
Defining Mm as the systematic mark-up for commodity m, the rent formula for the MUP system 
is: 
  mimimimimmi qCPM  

1        (13) 
Observe the effects of deviations from best-practices total costs.  Referring to equations (5) and 
(6): 
 01


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
    for all τmi>0.        (14) 
This is the same as with the TDP system.  Rent can’t be gained by incurring excess non-
innovation costs (waste) above best-practices levels.  But the incentives associated with cost 
structures below best practices are different: 
  11 
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  for all τmi<0.      (15) 
The partial derivative in the first right-hand-side term, from equation (6), is negative, but   is 
multiplied by a number greater than 1, (1+Mm).  The rent seeking possibilities from cutting costs 
relative to best-practices levels are greatly diminished and, over a plausible range, would reduce 
profits below opportunity cost.  Such cost cutting would only produce rents if the market does 
not sufficiently discount for substandard goods and the discount is less than cut costs by at least 
the amount 1/(1+Mm). 
 
4.2.2. Quality and Product Differentiation in an MUP System 
An innovative farmer would incur additional costs to produce agricultural products that are of 
enhanced quality, or are differentiated by desired characteristics, if such costs are more than 
made up by the price premiums the market is willing to pay for higher-quality goods.  In the 
mark-up system, if the farmer can earn a price premium over the standard price in the market, 
then he has also increased his base for Deficit Payment purposes.  The market premium 
associated with higher quality is thus magnified by application of the fixed mark-up to the higher 
price received by the farmer in the market.   
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The result for incurring costs associated with quality and product differentiation is as follows for 
the MUP system. 
  11 
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Normally, the increase in price associated with quality enhancement would have to exceed 
expenditure to produce quasi rents.  The derivative on the right hand side would have to be 
greater than 1.  But in the case of a MUP system the partial derivative in the first right-hand-side 
term no longer has to be greater than 1, because it is multiplied by (1+Mm).  Indeed, if the mark-
up percentage is 25% (the mark-up derived in the numerical example), the change in a farm’s 
price in the market only has to rise a bit more than .8% for every 1% increase in quality-related 
expenditure.  The MUP reinforces investment in quality-enhancement and product-
differentiation expenditures which, under plausible scenarios, can produce quasi rents. 
 
4.3 Hybrid Mark-up/Decoupled-Payment Method 
An option that would employ Green-Box subsidies and minimize the use of Amber-Box 
subsidies would be a hybrid system.  Under such a system a per-hectare decoupled income 
payment would be paid to the farmer in a set amount for each commodity.  This payment would 
not vary with production.  The decoupled payment could be supplemented by an MUP.  Note 
that only the latter would be considered Amber-Box, and the system could be structured so that 
trade-distorting subsidies do not exceed the WTO-mandated 10% of production value. 
The economic incentives of the hybrid system would be very similar to those associated with the 
pure mark-up system.  A farmer incurs fixed costs that don’t vary with production and variable 
costs that do.  A decoupled income payment is equivalent to a fixed-cost subsidy, while the 
positive incentives toward product differentiation and quality enhancement would derive from 
the MUP. 
 
5. A Numerical Example of the MSS—Corn 
In this section a numerical example of the MSS is provided.  The example considers a 
hypothetical, representative 100 hectare farm that produces only corn, abstracting from crop 
rotation.  The illustration first shows the calculation of the FCP for corn from the hypothetical 
farm and then calculates a MUP under a percentage mark-up and a hybrid mark-up/decoupled 
payment system. 
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This example is for illustrative purposes only, and the actual quantitative result should not be 
perceived literally.  The data for the example are derived from representative farms in countries 
with climatic conditions typical for the GCC, and were chosen to be as realistic as possible for 
farms employing best practices.  Similarly, capital costs are derived from data in the region 
deemed representative.  All costs are expressed in U.S. dollars. 
 
5.1 The FCP 
Data on operating costs for this hypothetical farm were primarily provided by the International 
Center for Agricultural Research in Dry Areas (ICARDA).14  Table 1 displays assumed operating 
costs (variable and allocated fixed costs) on a per-hectare basis. [Place Table 1 approximately 
here] 
 
The user cost of capital calculation, based on the expression in equation (3), begins with a 
delineation of required physical assets and their original cost. 15  Other required inputs are the 
economic depreciation rate for each physical asset and the appropriate rate of inflation. 
Data for the economic depreciation rate, δ, for each asset category are based on the work of 
Hulten and Wykoff, (1981).  We use the Qatari annual inflation rate in our example which over 
the 2000-2009 period averaged 6.18 percent.  The WACC is calculated next, as it is used 
frequently in Middle East modeling. (Al Mutairi et al 2009)  Our WACC computation is based 
primarily on data gathered from the State of Qatar. 
In Middle Eastern countries the most popular source of debt financing is bank borrowing, while 
debt financing through issuance of debt securities is rather limited. (IMF, 2009)   We assume that 
the investor receives debt financing, and that a cost of debt of 5.25 %, which is the yield on a 
recent 10-year sovereign bond issued by the State of Qatar, is a plausible approximation of bank-
borrowing interest rates. 
 
CAPM is used to calculate the equity hurdle rate relevant to potential investors in the Watan 
corn farm. Various studies considered evidence on CAPM betas in agriculture. (Erickson et al 
2001; Turvey and Driver 1987; Hopkins and Morehart 2002)  
 
                                                 
14 Operating cost data were based primarily on farms in Syria and were transmitted by Aden Aw-Hassan and Ahmad 
Maziz, ICARDA, Aleppo, Syria. 
   
15 These data were provided by Aden Aw-Hassan, ICARDA, Aleppo, Syria. 
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CAPM is estimated using realized excess returns, as follows: 
    FMFE iiii         (17) 
, the intercept, should not be statistically different from zero (because the market premium 
should compensate for systemic risk) and  is interpreted in the standard fashion.  
Equation (17) is estimated as follows, incorporating two caveats: Benjelloun and Squalli (2008) 
have demonstrated that in the emerging capital markets of the GCC, general stock indexes often 
poorly reflect individual-sector performance.  As will be seen, however, robust results are 
obtained for Qatar.  Market-returns data are obtained from the Qatar Exchange (QE) for 
month-end equity market index values of the Qatar Index. Benjelloun (2009) has shown that in 
certain GCC stock markets diversification can be achieved with only a few stocks in a portfolio, 
systemic risk is high and index and stock returns are highly correlated.  With this caveat, our 
proxy asset-specific return is the rate of return on a relatively risky stock—Commercial Bank of 
Qatar (CBQK).   
 
The risk-free return is derived from 10-year U.S. government bond yields with average 
annualized monthly yields obtained from International Financial Statistics, published by the 
International Monetary Fund.  Asset-specific excess returns are regressed on market excess 
returns using ordinary least squares (OLS) and also alternative robust-estimation procedures.  
These include the Median estimator, least trimmed squares (LTS) (Rousseeuw 1984), Huber’s 
(1964) M-estimators, and the MM-estimators proposed by Yohai (1987).  
 
OLS has problems when observations with very large residuals distort parameter estimation due 
to outliers. (Verardi and Croux 2009) The basic measure of the robustness of an estimator is its 
“breakdown point,” which is the fraction of “bad” data that can be tolerated without affecting 
the estimator to an arbitrarily large extent. The M-estimator and Rousseeuw’s LTS estimator are 
highly inefficient in that high efficiency can only be achieved at the cost of lower breakdown 
points. MM-estimators combine a high breakdown point with high efficiency. 
We consider two versions of this estimator: MM-estimators with 70% efficiency and with 95% 
efficiency. Simulation results by Verardi and Croux (2009) show that the MM-estimator with an 
efficiency of 70% is the least biased estimator, and results produced by this method are the ones 
reported in this paper.  
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The sample period is January 2000 to December 2009.  The regression results for Equation (17) 
are as follows (standard errors are in parenthesis): 
iE-iF = 0.186 + 1.226  (iM-iF) 
  (0.855)  (0.054) 
  Robust R2 = 0.894 
 
 is estimated at 1.226 and is statistically significant at the 1% level.  The coefficient of the 
intercept is not significantly different from zero. 
 
Over the 2000-2009 sample period the average annualized market rate of return was 25.58%, 
while during the same period the average annualized risk-free return was 4.45%, indicating a 
market risk premium of 21.07%. The asset-specific (CBQK) risk premium, the product of 
CAPM β and the market risk premium, is 25.83%.  
 
Debt/equity mixes in a nascent Arab micro state agricultural sector will be a function of 
contracting practices, potential governmental loan guarantees, and the MSS.  We assume, for 
illustrative purposes, that agricultural investments enjoy long term take-and-pay contracts and 
loan guarantees—facilitating low-cost interest rates and high proportions of debt.  The 
debt/equity ratio is set at 70/30.  Therefore, the WACC is 11.42%.   Table 2 displays for each 
physical asset total-farm original asset costs, the economic depreciation rate, and the calculated 
user cost of capital. [Place Table 2 approximately here] 
 
Yield estimates for corn cultivation in arid climates for good farms vary widely.  For example De 
Pauw (2010) uses a range of 4 to 6 tonnes/hectare, but also refers to a research result of 9 
tonnes/hectare.  Data from functioning farms in UAE have shown yields of 12 tonnes/hectare, 
but this seems too high for a meaningful demonstration. (UAE 2006) For purposes of this 
illustration we assume a yield of 6 tonnes/hectare.   
 
The result produced by summing per-hectare costs and dividing by yield is the FCP of producing 
a tonne of corn on the hypothetical 100 hectare Watan farm.  As depicted in Table 3, the 
calculated FCP per tonne for corn is $387.  [Place Table 3 approximately here] 
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5.2 The Deficit Payment--Two Options 
Should the market price, determined by import prices of corn, be lower than the full economic 
cost of domestic production as depicted in Table 3 (and eliminating as a candidate the TDP), a 
MUP of some sort (or another mechanism not discussed in this paper) will be required to ensure 
that farming remains financially sustainable to private investors.  This section will provide 
numerical examples for two options—a stand-alone MUP and an MUP/decoupled-payment 
system.  The data required for the examples are displayed in Table 4.  The economic cost of 
domestically produced corn from our hypothetical Watan farm is compared to the weighted 
average price of imported corn over 2007 and 2008, which is employed to represent a single 
market transaction price.16  As illustrated, the weighted-average import price is $311/tonne and 
the deficit is $76/tonne.  Selected individual shipment prices are also displayed for comparison 
purposes.17 [Place Table 4 approximately here] 
 
5.2.1. A Pure MUP System 
First consider a pure percentage mark-up system.  Recent import data would be compared to the 
constructed cost in the FCP model for each commodity—to produce the percentage mark-up.  
When a farmer sold his goods he would be eligible for the amount he actually received in the 
market, plus an MUP equal to the product of the mark-up and his actual market price. 
In our example, the calculated deficit is $76/tonne, 24.4% of the weighted-average import price 
for corn of $311/tonne.  Under the MUP system the authorities could set the deficit mark-up at, 
say, 25%.  If a farmer gained in the market a price exactly equal to $311/tonne, he would receive 
a MUP of $77.75/tonne.  If the farmer produced an inferior product that sold at a discount in 
the market, say $290/tonne, his MUP would be $72.50/tonne for total remuneration of 
$362.50/tonne.  Unless the farmer could reduce costs by more than the FCP less total payment, 
which is unlikely, compensation would be less than economic cost and insufficient to remit the 
opportunity cost of capital.  If he sold a superior, differentiated product at a premium price on 
the market, say $350/tonne, his MUP would be $87.50/tonne for total remuneration of 
$437.50/tonne—which would likely include economic rents.   
 
If a farmer’s costs were higher than the FCP’s best-practices model costs, he would suffer low 
returns.  For example a farmer with total economic costs of $400/tonne, but producing corn of 
                                                 
16 Representative import data is based on monthly corn import prices in Qatar as provided by the Qatar Statistics 
Authority (2009). 
 
17 These values were derived from micro-data produced by Qatar Customs and Ports Authority. 
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average quality would still receive $311/tonne in the market.  With the MUP his total 
remuneration would be $388.75/tonne, $11.25/tonne less than total economic costs.  This loss 
would come directly out of equity returns.   
 
A pure MUP system has a lot to recommend it.  Quality enhancement and differentiated 
products are rewarded.  There is, however, a major draw-back.  The MUP system is an Amber 
Box subsidy under WTO definitions.  A pure MUP system would put Watan in a position of 
implementing trade-distorting subsidies in excess of the 10% de minimus level.  Using corn as an 
example, by definition the level of subsidy would be approximately 25% of the value of 
agricultural production, as represented by actual market prices.   
 
5.2.2. A Hybrid System 
There are alternatives that would ensure that farming is remunerative and would maintain the 
positive incentives of the percentage mark-up system, but would keep Amber-Box subsidies 
below the 10% threshold.  A hybrid system including a decoupled income payment and a MUP 
has potential to produce the desired incentives without running afoul of WTO agreements. 
Consider the following possibility.  From the data in Table 3 it can be calculated that variable 
costs are 30.51% of total economic cost/tonne of corn, or $118.17.  Allocated fixed costs are 
$11.17/tonne, or 2.88% of unit cost.  Capital costs are about 66.61% of unit cost; $258.  A 
hybrid system could be designed to pay, say, a $270/hectare decoupled income-support payment.  
This payment would not be linked to production, is Green Box, and would only be offered to 
active corn farms.  The total decoupled support would be solely a function of the size of the 
farm.  For a farm with a yield of 6 tonnes/hectare, the decoupled payment is economically 
equivalent to about a $45/tonne subsidy of fixed and capital costs.  On top of this is added a 
percentage MUP of 10% of the price the farmer actually receives in the market.  Assuming an 
average market price of $311/tonne, the MUP will be about $31/tonne.  The sum of the market 
price, the pro-rated decoupled income payment and the Deficit Payment is $387/tonne, exactly 
equal FCP for the representative farm. 
 
Under this hybrid system, the positive incentives of the mark-up system are maintained, if 
somewhat diminished, but total Amber-Box support is approximately 10%, the threshold level 
for trade-distorting subsidies established in the Agreement on Agriculture.   
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There is any number of combinations of systems that would achieve the same qualitative result.  
This illustration shows that it is possible to construct a MSS for a hypothetical country like 
Watan that is WTO-compliant, minimizes perverse incentives and enhances positive ones, and is 
capable of ensuring financial sustainability for investors of all sorts in the Qatari agricultural 
sector. 
 
6. Discussion and Future Research 
This paper has derived a conceptual model for a Market Stabilization System (MSS) appropriate 
for agriculture in Arab micro states.  The components of the model were 1) a Full Cost Price 
(FCP) that accounted for all variable and fixed costs and the opportunity cost of capital for a unit 
of production of an agricultural commodity; and 2) a Deficit Payment that made up the 
difference between the FCP and the price a farmer received in the market for a specific 
transaction.  The paper analyzed several options for a Deficit Payment and concluded that the 
one that displayed the most desirable characteristics was one where the farmer received a 
percentage mark-up on the price received in the market for a specific sale.  The mark-up would 
be set to be the percentage difference between the FCP and the frequently-adjusted weighted-
average import price for each commodity.  The deficit payment would be calculated on a 
transaction-by-transaction basis—made possible by the small scale of the target countries; Arab 
micro states.  The transactions-based system is key to maximization of a desirable incentive 
structure. 
 
The Deficit Payment structure described makes best use of market signals, punishes inefficiency, 
and rewards quality enhancement and product differentiation.  It has been designed to be 
compliant with the WTO Agreement on Agriculture.  
The model was designed for micro states with emerging or embryonic agricultural sectors.  But it 
is also appropriate for countries which desire to enhance their existing agricultural sectors by 
better aligning production and market incentives.  Food-security concerns make both scenarios 
likely. 
 
This paper has only presented a conceptual model for a Market Stabilization System for Arab 
micro states.  Much additional research remains to be done prior to serious consideration of 
implementation. 
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Any domestic support system contains the seeds for fraudulently gaming the system.  It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to address fraud and audit issues, but anti-fraud measures should 
rank high on the list of future research topics.  Two potential sources of fraud initially come to 
mind:  1) origin fraud; and 2) collusion between buyer and seller to fraudulently overstate invoice 
price.   
 
Additional research must be conducted on the incentive effects of various alternative Deficit-
Payment formats.  This paper has just scratched the surface by discussing a few options.   
This paper provided a simple numerical example of the functioning of a potential Market 
Stabilization System for agriculture in a hypothetical Arab micro state.  If the system is to 
become operational in any particular country, substantial research must be devoted to optimizing 
data sources for each affected commodity, in order to produce FCPs that are precise 
representations of full economic costs.   
 
Finally this paper did not address the administration of a MSS.  All of the institutional details, 
and day-to-day administrative functions, must be delineated in future research. 
  22 
References   
Agricultural & Applied Economics Association (AAEA), 2000. Commodity Costs and Returns 
Estimation Handbook, Ames, Iowa. 
Al-Nasser, a., 2006.  Regional Report: Poultry industry in Kuwait. World's Poultry Science Journal, 
62, 702-708. 
Al Mutairi, M. E., Tian, G., Tan, A., 2009. Corporate finance practice in Kuwait: a survey to 
confront theory with practice. Paper presented to the 22nd Australasian Finance and 
Banking Conference 2009. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1456750.  
Benjelloun, H., 2009. Portfolio diversification: evidence from Qatar and the UAE. Int. J.Econ. Iss., 
2, 9-15. 
Benjelloun, H., Squalli, J., 2008. Do general indexes mask sectoral inefficiencies?  A multiple 
variance ratio assessment of Middle Eastern equity markets. Int. J. Man. Fin., 4, 136-151. 
Bjornson, B., Innes, R., 1992. Another look at returns to agriculture and nonagricultural assets, 
Am. J. Agric. Econ., 74, 109-119. 
De Pauw, E., 2010. Land survey for suitability and availability for food and feed production in 
Qatar. The Agricultural Sector in Qatar: Challenges and Opportunities, International Center for 
Agricultural Research in Dry Areas (ICARDA), Aleppo, Syria. 
Erickson, K.W., Mishra, A.M., Moss, C.B., 2001. Rates of return in the farm and non-farm 
sectors: a time series comparison. Paper presented to the 2001 Annual Meeting of 
Western Agricultural Economics Association, July 8-11, Utah. 
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) 2010. Country profile: food security indicators—
Kuwait. FAO Rome. 
Fullerton, D., 1987. The indexation of interest, depreciation and tax reform in the United States. 
J. Pub. Econ., 32, 25-51. 
Hall, R., Jorgenson, D., 1967. Tax policy and investment behavior. Am. Econ. Rev., 57, 391-414. 
Hopkins, J.W., Morehart M., 2002. An empirical analysis of the farm problem: comparability in 
rates of return, in Luther Tweeten and Stanley R. Thompson-eds. Agricultural Policy for 
21st Century Iowa State Press, Iowa, 70-90. 
Huber, P.J., 1964. Robust estimation of a location parameter, Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 35, 
73–101. 
Hulten, C.R., Wykoff, F.C., 1981. The measurement of economic depreciation, in C.R. Hulten-
ed., Depreciation, Inflation, and the Taxation of Income from Capital, Urban Institute Press, 
Washington DC, 81-125. 
  23 
IMF, 2009. Global Financial Stability Report, International Monetary Fund, October, Washington 
DC. 
Jorgenson, D., 1963. Capital theory and investment behavior,  Am. Econ. Rev., 53, 247-259. 
Klein, B., Leffler, K., 1981. The role of market forces in assuring contractual performance, J. Pol. 
Econ., 89, 615-641. 
Lagerkvist, C., 1999. The user cost of capital in Danish and Swedish agriculture, Eur. Rev.  Ag. 
Econ., 26, 79-100. 
Landes, W.M., Posner, R.A., 1987. Trademark law: an economic perspective, J. Law Econ., 30, 
265-309. 
Lewis, P.E.T., Hall, N.H., Savage, C.R., Kingston, A.G., 1988. Taxation, cost of capital and 
investment in Australian agriculture, Aust. J. Agric. Econ., 32, 15-21. 
Lintner, J., 1964. The valuation of risky assets and the selection of risky investments in stock 
portfolios and capital budgets, Rev.  Econ. Stat., 47, 13-37. 
Mazid, A. Aw-Hassan, A., 2010.  Report on cost production costs in Qatar, The Agricultural Sector 
in Qatar: Challenges and Opportunities, International Center for Agricultural Research in Dry 
Areas (ICARDA), Aleppo, Syria,  413-424. 
Narrod, C., Roy, D., Okello, J., Avendãno, B., Rich, K., Thorat, A., 2009.  Public-private 
partnerships and collective action in high value fruit and vegetable supply chains, Food 
Policy, 34, 8-15. 
Qatar National Food Security Programme (QNFSP) 2012. http://www.qnfsp.gov.qa/ 
Qatar Statistics Authority (2009): Monthly HS 8-digit data for 2004-2006 provided electronically. 
Raboy, D.G., Simpson, T., 1992. A methodology for tariffication of commodity trade in the 
presence of quality differences—the case of peanuts, World Econ., 15, 271-281.  
Raboy, D.G., Wiggins S.N., 1997. Intangible capital, hedonic pricing and international transfer 
prices, Pub. Fin. Rev., 25, 347-365. 
Rich, K.M., Narrod, C.A., 2010.  The role of public-private partnerships in promoting 
smallholder access to livestock markets in developing countries, Discussion Paper 01001, 
International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington DC. 
Rosenbaum, R.E., Wilson W.W., 1991. Quality differentials and prices: are cherries lemons?, J. 
Ind. Econ., 34, 649-658. 
Rousseeuw, P.J., 1984. Least median of squares regression, J. Am. Stat. Assoc., 79, 871–880. 
 
Sharpe, W.F., 1964. Capital asset prices: a theory of market equilibrium under conditions of risk, 
J. Fin., 19, 425-442. 
  24 
Streeten, P., 1993. The special problems of small countries, World Dev., 21, 197-202. 
Turvey, C.G., Driver, H.C., 1987. Systematic and nonsystematic risks in agriculture,” Can. J. 
Agric. Econ., 35, 387-401. 
United Arab Emirates (UAE),  Ministry of Economy, 2006. Statistical Abstract, Accessed in 
February 2010. 
http://www.economy.ae/English/EconomicAndStatisticReports/StatisticReports/Statis
ticAbstract/Pages/sa2006.aspx . 
United Arab Emirates (UAE), National Bureau of Statistics.  Accessed in May 2012.  
http://www.uaestatistics.gov.ae 
USDA-Economic Research Service, 2009: “Commodity Costs and Returns,” at 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/CostsAndReturns/, Washington DC. 
USDA-Foreign Agricultural Service (USDA-FAS) 2006. Kuwait poultry products annual poultry 
meat report 2006. GAIN Report KU6002. United States Department of Agriculture, 
Washington DC, 
Verardi, V., Croux C., 2009. Robust regression in stata, Stata J., 9, 439-453. 
Wiggins, S., Raboy, D.G., 1996. Price premia to name brands: an empirical analysis, J. Ind. Econ., 
44, 377-388. 
Williamson, O., 1975. Markets and Hierarchies, Free Press, New York, NY. 
World Bank 2009.  Improving Food Security in Arab Countries.  World Bank. Washington DC. 
World Trade Organization, 1995. Agreement on Agriculture, Geneva, CH. 
World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture, 2008. Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture, 
TN/AG/W/4/Rev. 4, December, Geneva, CH. 
  25 
 
Table 1:  Corn Farm Operating Costs (100 hectare farm) 
   Total 
Farm 
Per hectare 
Variable Costs Tillage and Leveling  $98 
 Seed  $18 
 Fertilizer and other chemicals  $97 
 Water  $76 
 Maintenance  $57 
 Labor  $235 
 Harvesting and Transport  $95 
  Packing materials   $33 
Allocated Fixed 
Costs 
Marketing Costs $300 $3 
 Computer Services $100 $1 
 Accounting Costs $900 $9 
 Management Overhead $2,600 $26 
 General Farm Overhead $1,700 $17 
  Other Farm Overhead $1,100 $11 
Source:  Data from ICARDA, provided by Aden Aw-Hassan and Ahmad Maziz. 
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Table 2: Machinery Requirements, Unit Prices, Economic Depreciation and User Cost of 
Capital for a Representative Arid-Climate 100 Hectare Corn Farm 
Machinery Number 
Unit price 
(US$) 
Economic 
Depreciation 
User cost of 
capital 
Tractor FEL (Small) 1 $60,000 0.1633 $12,942.00 
Tractor (Medium) 1 $90,000 0.1633 $19,413.00 
Planter 4 m 1 $65,000 0.0971 $9,717.50 
Irrigation boom & sprinkler 1 $85,000 0.0971 $12,707.50 
Irrigation pipe network & 
pump 
10km $45,000 0.0971 $6,727.50 
Plough (Moouldboard) 1 $25,000 0.0971 $3,737.50 
Cultivator 15 tyne (Duck foot) 1 $25,000 0.0971 $3,737.50 
Boomsprayer 12m 2000l 1 $40,000 0.0971 $5,980.00 
Fertilizer spreader 20m 1 $40,000 0.0971 $5,980.00 
Combine harvestor (4m) 1 $250,000 0.0971 $37,375.00 
Grain handling equipment 1 $8,000 0.0971 $1,196.00 
Grain storage (40 tonne) 1 $10,000 0.1225 $1,749.00 
Machinery shed (30m ´ 10m) 1 $20,000 0.1225 $3,498.00 
Machinery workshop/store  1 $25,000 0.1225 $4,372.50 
Truck (5 tonne) 1 $55,000 0.2537 $16,835.50 
Pickup vehicle 1 $22,000 0.3333 $8,485.40 
Computers 1 $1,500 0.2729 $487.95 
TOTALS for 100 hectares  $866,500  $154,942 
Per hectare costs 
 $8,665  $1,549 
Source:  Original cost data from ICARDA, provided by Aden Aw-Hassan.  Economic 
depreciation rates from Hulten and Wykoff (1981) 
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Table 3:  Economic Cost of Corn Per Tonne 
   Total 
Farm 
Per hectare 
Variable Costs Tillage and Leveling  $98 
  Seed  $18 
  Fertilizer and other chemicals  $97 
  Water  $76 
  Maintenance  $57 
  Labor  $235 
  Harvesting and Transport  $95 
  Packing materials   $33 
Allocated 
Overheads 
Marketing Costs $300 $3 
  Computer Services $100 $1 
  Accounting Costs $900 $9 
  Management Overhead $2,600 $26 
  General Farm Overhead $1,700 $17 
  Other Farm Overhead $1,100 $11 
User Cost of 
Capital 
Tractor FEL (Small) $12,942.00 $129 
  Tractor (Medium) $19,413.00 $194 
  Planter 4 m $9,717.50 $97 
  Irrigation boom & sprinkler $12,707.50 $127 
  Irrigation pipe network & pump $6,727.50 $67 
  Plough (Moouldboard) $3,737.50 $37 
  Cultivator 15 tyne (Duck foot) $3,737.50 $37 
  Boomsprayer 12m 2000l $5,980.00 $60 
  Fertilizer spreader 20m $5,980.00 $60 
  Combine harvestor (4m) $37,375.00 $374 
  Grain handling equipment $1,196.00 $12 
  Grain storage (40 tonne) $1,749.00 $17 
  Machinery shed (30m ´ 10m) $3,498.00 $35 
  Machinery workshop/store (30m ´ 
10m) 
$4,372.50 $44 
  Truck (5 tonne) $16,835.50 $168 
  Pickup vehicle $8,485.40 $85 
  Computers $487.95 $5 
  TOTAL Per HECTARE= $2,324 
  YIELD Per HECTARE (tonnes)= 6 
  Economic Cost Per Tonne= $387 
 Source: calculations from Tables 1 and 2.  Yield data from DePauw (2010)
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Table 4:  Calculation of Deficit Payment  
Economic Cost/Tonne of 
Corn From Hypothetical 
Watan Farm 
$387 
2007/2008 Weighted 
Average Import Price in 
Qatar 
$311 
Excess Domestic Cost Over 
Import-Price Determined 
Market Price 
$76 
Sample Shipment Prices-Doha Port Arrivals 
DATE ORIGIN C.I.F. PRICE/TONNE 
10-Feb-07 Argentina $293 
19-May-07 Argentina $293 
1-Jul-07 Argentina $293 
29-Jul-07 Argentina $293 
17-Sep-07 Argentina $292 
1-Nov-07 US $339 
17-Dec-07 US $351 
 Source:  Data from Qatar Statistics Authority (2009) and micro-data from the Customs 
and Ports Authority of the State of Qatar. 
 
